

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 00292 01 OF 02 121945Z
ACTION SS-25

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USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3220
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 0292

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU
SUBJECT: US-TURKISH RELATIONS

1. I WAS CALLED TO MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT AT FIVE O'CLOCK JAN 10 FOR A "FIFTEEN MENUTE" SESSION THAT TURNED INTO A FIFTY MINUTE MEETING DURING WHICH ECEVIT DID MOST OF THE TALKING. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER OKCUN AND TULUMEN FOR THE FOREIGN OFFICE. DCM DILLON ACCOMPANIED ME.

2. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WASHINGTON WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME ANY INFORMATION THAT HE COULD GIVE ME ABOUT HIS TALKS WITH SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM AND WHATEVER HE COULD COMMUNICATE ON HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD BOTH US-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, ON WHICH HE HAD MADE A NUMBER OF RECENT STATMENTS TO THE PRESS. I SAID THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY VANCE, CLARK CLIFFORD AND OTHERS
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IN WASHINGTON ARE DETERMINED TO RESTORE A STRONG US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP. BOTH VANCE AND CLIFFORD ASKED ME TO CONVEY THEIR HIGHEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND THEIR HOPE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH TURKEY'S PRESSING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.

3. WASHINGTON HAD NOTED HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY ATTENTION AND THAT A SETTLEMENT IS IN TURKEY'S INTEREST, COMPLETELY ASIDE FROM THE US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP. THE US WELCOMES THIS, AS WE HAVE NO INHERENT REASON, BEYOND IMPROVING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, TO SEEK AN ACTIVE US ROLE OR INVOLVEMENT. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT TO US AS WE WORK TOWARD OUR OBJECTIVE OF REBUILDING A STRONG BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS MOVING TOWARD RESOLUTION.

4. I RECALLED THAT OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS WE HAD MOST USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS STAFF ON HOW TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.

5. I NOTED THAT HE MIGHT WELL HAVE OTHER IDEAS ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND US-TURKISH RELATIONS, AND WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME HIS THOUGHTS. IF HE FELT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THESE MATTERS, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO ARRANGE A VISIT TO ANKARA OR SOME OTHER CONVENIENT LOCATION OF A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL FROM WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS AND HOW WE COULD BEST PROCEED TOGETHER TOWARD OUR COMMON GOALS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

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6. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED ME FOR WHAT I HAD SAID AND ALSO FOR THE MESSAGE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SENT SO QUICKLY ON HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP. HE WISHED TO EXPLAIN THAT HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS NOT A SIGN OF ANY HARD FEELINGS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. HE UNDERSTOOD THE US WAS A GLOBAL POWER AND HAD INTERESTS IN THE AREA. TURKEY WANTED TO SETTLE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE ITS OWN INTERESTS DICTATED THIS. IF THE TURKISH-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP AND CYPRUS WERE TIED TOGETHER IT WOULD ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH BOTH ISSUES. HE WISHED TO SETTLE THE CYPRUS ISSUE REGARDLESS OF THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE PROBLEM OF LINKAGE WAS IN THE CONGRESS, BUT IT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL TO HIM IF THE ADMINISTRATION MADE ANY STATEMENTS IMPLYING THAT IT ENDORSED ANY SUCH LINKAGE. HE INTENDED TO MAKE "CERTAIN MOVES" ON CYPRUS. IF THE US WAS ABLE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THIS COULD BE USEFUL.

7. ECEVIT IMPLIED THAT LINKAGE GAVE GREECE LEVERAGE;
HE ASSERTED GREECE WOULD TRY TO EXPLOIT PUBLIC OPINION AND TO
THE EXTEND THAT IT COULD DO SO SUCCESSFULLY ITS POSITIONS
WOULD BE MORE RIGID. HE RECALLED THE COMING TOGETHER OF
ATATURK AND VENIZELOS IN THE 1920'S AND MENDERES AND CARA-
MANLIS' ABILITY TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS IN THE 50'S AS
EXAMPLES OF THE ABILITY OF THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS
TO GET TOGETHER FACE-TO-FACE WHEN THE GREAT POWERS WERE
"OCCUPIED ELSEWHERE". THESE EXAMPLES WERE VERY MUCH ON
HIS MIND IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. ECEVIT THEN SAID HE WANTED TO TELL ME ABOUT
HIS TALKS WITH WALDHEIM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL, HE
SAID, WANTED A TURKISH "GREEN LIGHT" FOR RESUMPTION
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OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE HAD NOTED THE UNUSUAL
CHARACTER OF THE UNSYG'S DEEP INVOLVEMENT IN THIS
ISSUE AND FELT THEREFORE THAT THE TALKS MUST BE
SUCCESSFUL.

9. ECEVIT RECALLED TO WALDHEIM THAT HE HAD RESIGNED AS PRIME
MINISTER IN 1974 PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE PROBLEMS WITH
HIS COALITION PARTNER (ERBAKAN) PREVENTED MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS.
THERE ARE, HE SAID, NOW NO COALITION PROBLEMS. ALL,
INCLUDING THE INDEPENDENTS, ARE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE
ON THE NEED FOR POSITIVE MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS TOWARD A
BONAFIDE SOLUTION. AS SOON AS THE CONFIDENCE VOTE HAS
TAKEN PLACE, HE SAID, HE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ENCOURAGE
THE TFSC TO GO BACK TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 0292

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10. HE FELT THAT THE TURKISH SIDE SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON THE TERRITORIAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING PRESENTATION OF A MAP. HOWEVER, IN A NEGOTIATING SESSION, THE GREEKS SHOULD NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH. HE SAID THERE WERE LIMITS TO THE POLITICAL RISKS HE COULD TAKE, ALTHOUGH HE IS PREPARED TO CAST MANY OF THESE ASIDE. THERE ARE ALSO RISKS OF STIMULATING FURTHER STRIFE ON THE ISLAND. SINCE 1974 THE SITUATION HAS BECOME MORE SETTLED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE AND TOO MUCH CHANGE CANNOT BE EXPECTED. HOWEVER, THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE IS NEGOTIABLE "WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS", AND TURKEY IS PREPARED TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE ON THIS ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

11. COMMENTING ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, HE SAID THAT HE WOULD RESTUDY THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE TURKISH SIDE. HE FELT THAT THE EARLIER PROPOSALS WOULD NOT ENCOURAGE THE EMERGENCE OF A TRUE FEDERATION, AND HE INSISTED THAT FEDERATION, NOT CONFEDERATION, WAS HIS OBJECTIVE. HE DID NOT WANT AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO A SPLIT ON THE ISLAND, WITH TWO STATES JOINING THEIR

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MOTHER COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD INJECT GREEK POWER FURTHER INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. HOWEVER, THE ARRANGEMENTS MUST GIVE THE TURKISH COMMUNITY SUFFICIENT AUTONOMY TO INSURE ITS SECURITY. TURKEY WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA AS WELL.

12. ECEVIT SAID THAT THESE TURKISH MOVES WOULD NOT BE HELD UP TO AWAIT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. IF THE CONGRESS MOVES ON THE DCA, SO MUCH THE BETTER. THIS WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.

13. ECEVIT ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD WALDHEIM, AS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THAT CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN ARE SEPARATE ISSUES, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO WORK ON THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY SINCE PROGRESS ON EITHER WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS ON THE OTHER.

14. ECEVIT SAID THAT WALDHEIM HAD ASKED IF HE WISHED HIM TO TRY TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH CARAMANLIS. HE HAD ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY AND WALDHEIM SAID HE

WOULD PROPOSE IT IN ATHENS. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF WALDHEIM APPRECIATED THAT THIS COULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR CARAMANLIS, WHO APPARENTLY DID NOT WANT SUCH A MEETING. SINCE 1974 THE GREEKS HAD AVOIDED A DIALOGUE AT A HIGH LEVEL, PREFERING DISCUSSION AMONG TECHNICIANS. HOWEVER, SAID ECEVIT, TECHNICIANS NEED POLITICAL DIRECTIVES. HE FELT THAT THE GREEK BUREAUCRACY WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO PREVENT A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN HIM AND CARAMANLIS. THIS MIGHT BE AN EXAMPLE OF THE WELL-KNOWN PHENOMENON OF DEFORMATION PROFESSIONELLE, A DESIRE TO KEEP THE REINS IN ITS OWN HANDS.

15. ECEVIT SAID HE KNEW THERE WERE DANGERS IN HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUES. HE RUEFULLY NOTED THAT SADAT MAY COME TO REGRET HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT

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THINK EVERYTHING HAD TO BE AGREED ON AT SUCH A MEETING AND HE WAS PREPARED TO SO STATE IN ADVANCE IN ORDER TO AVOID EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS. HE FELT IT WAS NATURAL FOR NEIGHBORING PRIME MINISTERS TO MEET AND DISCUSS COMMON PROBLEMS AND PERHAPS DRAFT A POLITICAL DIRECTIVE WHICH WOULD GOVERN THE WORK OF TECHNICIANS.

16. AS REGARDS THE AEGEAN, HE BELIEVED THE GREEKS HAD EXPLOITED THE POSITION THEY HAD ENJOYED IN A CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR ROLE IN NATO TO ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AIR AND THE SEA BEDS. TURKEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE EXCLUSION WHICH WAS IMPLICIT IN THE GREEK POSITION. HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP THE US COULD GIVE IN ENCOURAGING THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THE TURKISH REQUIREMENTS IN THIS AREA MORE SERIOUSLY. HE RECALLED THE SUPPORT THAT KISSINGER HAD GIVEN TURKEY IN 1976 DURING THE SISMIT DISPUTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

17. ECEVIT SAID THAT HE HAD REMINDED WALDHEIM THAT IN JULY 1974, AT THE FIRST GENEVA MEETING, A DOCUMENT HAD BEEN AGREED RECOGNIZING THE EXISTENCE OF TWO SEPARATE AND AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS IN CYPRUS. HE HAD THOUGHT THIS MATTER HAD BEEN SETTLED BUT NOW HIS RECENT STATEMENTS CLINGING, INTER ALIA, FOR A "BIZONAL STATE" WERE BEING CRITICIZED IN THE GREEK PRESS.

18. ECEVIT CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WISHED TO HAVE THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND WITH ME PERSONALLY AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE ME AT ANY TIME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. HE PROMISED TO KEEP ME FULLY INFORMED AS THE TURKISH POSITION EVOLVED IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

19. COMMENT: ELEKDAG'S PREVIOUSLY REPORTED SUGGESTION THAT I ASK FOR A MEETING WAS CLEARLY STIMULATED BY

THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF, WHO PRESUMABLY FOR REASONS
RELATING TO HIS DEALINGS WITH OTHER AMBASSADORS
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DID NOT WISH TO CALL ME IN ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE.
THIS WAS MY FIRST NON-SOCIAL OR PROTOCOL CONTACT
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE SPOKE RAPIDLY, AND I WAS
IMPRESSED BY HIS ARTICULATENESS, COMMAND OF THE
SITUATION, AND THE IMPRESSION HE CONVEYED OF
KNOWING JUST WHERE HE WANTED TO GO. IT WAS CLEAR
THAT HE IS GOING TO BE HIS OWN FOREIGN MINISTER.
OKCUN SAT SILENT THROUGHOUT THE SESSION. MUCH OF
WHAT ECEVIT SAID HAD BEEN FORESHADOWED IN THE PRESS
OVER THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS. IN THIS TALK,
HOWEVER, HE CARRIED HIS POSITION FURTHER. MOST
IMPORTANT, I FELT, WAS HIS AFFIRMATION OF WILLINGNESS
TO PRESENT A TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGHT HIS
REMARKS PERHAPS IMPLIED LESS FLEXIBILITY THAN CAGLAYNAGIL'S
ASSURANCE THAT TURKEY WOULD BE "GENEROUS" IN ITS
APPROACH ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE. ON CONSTITUTION
HE CONVEYED A SENSE OF MUCH GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND
WAS IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF THE NEGATIVENESS OF TURKEY'S
PREVIOUS POSITION.
MY VIEW AT THIS POINT IS THAT ECEVIT'S APPROACH
OPENS REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR BREAKING THE CYPRUS
LOGJAM AND FOR HELPING US WITH THE CONGRESS. HIS
INTEREST IN STARTING MOMENTUM GOING TOWARDS A
SETTLEMENT STRIKINGLY COINCIDES WITH OUR OWN, AND
I THINK THERE ARE CLEAR ADVANTAGES TO FINDING WAYS
OF ADAPTING TO AND ENCOURAGING HIS INITIATIVE.
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